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Disasters are associated strongly with forced migration. Indeed, migration is a standard survival strategy for
those facing disruptions of this kind. Such is the case with Mt. Merapi, Indonesia, where a series of eruptions
occurred in 2010. Mechanisms related to forced migration in such scenarios are fairly well understood, yet it
remains less clear what factors may influence return migration. Given local interest in facilitating resettlement
out of hazardous areas as a means of risk reduction, our objective in this study is to explore the extent to which
recovery aid may create incentives for households to move on rather than move home. Specifically, we explore
whether the influence of recovery aid varied by whether it was: financial vs. another type of aid; provided by a
government agency or NGO versus a social network; and/or distributed with other types of recovery aid. We use
data from a cross-sectional pilot study and multinomial logistic regression models to explore the influence of aid
on migration status. Of the various forms of aid considered, financial recovery aid was consistently associated
with moving on. The combination of financial recovery aid with remittances resulted in an association with
having moved on that was even stronger than just receiving financial recovery aid. Ultimately, analyses of “aid
packages” suggest that a combination of aid was relatively more effective in fostering resettlement, suggesting
that while other forms of aid may not have been sufficient to increase resettlement by themselves, they may
enhance the effect of financial recovery aid.

1. Introduction

homes/buildings were destroyed, and 383 people were killed.
Because disasters from natural hazards are associated with high risks
to both life and property [1,2], they are often associated strongly with
forced migration [3–6]; either as a temporary evacuation or as a forced
migration of longer duration. Indeed, migration, whether temporary or
permanent, is a standard survival strategy for those facing disruptions of
this kind [4]. Such is the case with Mt. Merapi where a major eruption
occurs every 4–5 years. However, despite the well-known danger, the
area surrounding the mountain remains densely populated. More sur
prisingly, it is also the site of frequent return migrations as households
persist in returning to their original communities once the dangers
associated with an eruption have subsided [7–10]. Anticipating that
patterns of return migration increases the risk for future disaster events
in the area surrounding Mt. Merapi, the Indonesian disaster manage
ment agency “Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana” (BNPB)

Between October 26th and November 5th, 2010, a series of violent
volcanic eruptions impacted the region surrounding Mt. Merapi in
Central Java, Indonesia. Over time, these eruptions culminated in
repeated discharges of ash and lava, as well as the formation of large
eruption columns that sent several pyroclastic flows into heavily
populated areas located along the slopes of the volcano. The seismic
activity was accompanied by heavy rainfall that produced highly
destructive lahars. The scale of the 2010 Mt. Merapi eruptions exceeded
that of the 1872 Mt. Merapi eruption, previously the largest eruption on
record for this volcano. Prior to the onset of these eruptions, the Indo
nesian government raised its alert to its highest level and issued evac
uation orders that affected 19,000 people. In total, however, it is
estimated that approximately 400,000 people were displaced, 3300
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conducted a risk assessment of the area and thereafter endeavored to
reorganize residential areas for the purpose of hazard mitigation [8].
With this goal in mind, the distribution of recovery assistance to victims
of the disaster was organized in part to create incentives for households
to resettle out of hazardous areas.
Our objective in this study is to explore the extent to which recovery
aid was associated with households resettling away from their original
community. Drawing on survey data collected from a cross-sectional
pilot study in the geographic area surrounding Mt. Merapi after the
2010 volcanic eruptions, we explore the extent to which various forms of
recovery aid were associated with migration status, particularly that of
respondents indicating that they had subsequently resettled or moved on.
Specifically, we explore whether the influence of a given type of re
covery aid varied by whether it was:

[1,4,5,27–30]. Hugo addressed these ideas and maintained that in the
context of disasters, migration is probably viewed best on a continuum
that ranges from totally voluntary migration–in which choice is the
decisive element that encourages people to move–to completely forced
migration, where the migrants are faced with death if they remain in
their present place of residence [4]. The extent to which a migration is
more or less forced depends upon the severity of the hazard, perceptions
of risk tied to the hazard [31], and the response of macro-level actors,
such as government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) [1,4,
32]. Given that forced migration is by definition less voluntary
compared to general migration [33], some indicators that weigh heavily
in general migration theory (e.g., gender and age) are not always sig
nificant and other indicators (e.g., socioeconomic status) may operate in
reverse [33]. This is particularly the case when the severity of the
disaster is such that entire populations are forced to migrate. However,
the more voluntary the migration, even after a disaster, the more likely it
will reflect the characteristics of general migrations [1,4].
Return migration post forced migration requires better understand
ing [34]. Consistent with general migration theory, prior studies have
found that economic incentives often are associated with the likelihood
of return migration [35]. Beyond economic incentives, a systematic re
view [36] identified the habitability of homes, access to affordable
housing, financial burdens, the extent of restoration of public services
and facilities, and a sense of place and identity as major factors influ
encing return migration in the aftermath of a disaster. Fear of future
disasters, stress associated with recovery, and loss of employment were
also influential [36]. Other research has shown that education,
employment, and other indicators of socioeconomic status may influ
ence return migration after a disaster resulting from a natural hazard
[37]. While return migrants face multiple intervening obstacles to
reestablishing themselves successfully in their old communities [34],
including the continued perception of risk associated with the previous
disaster [31], recovery aid in the aftermath of the disaster may help
mitigate various obstacles to returning home; e.g., helping to improve
the habitability of damaged homes, restoring public services and facil
ities, or to relieve stress associated with the disaster.

1. Financial vs. other types of aid (e.g., distribution of food)
2. Provided by government bodies or NGOs versus a household’s social
network
3. Distributed in combination with other types of recovery aid as part of
an “aid package” that include multiple types of aid.
As an exploratory examination of these questions, this study con
tributes to the literature on migration in the context of disasters from
natural hazards through suggesting how recovery aid may influence
migration decisions in this context and thereby be used as a tool for
future risk reduction.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. Migration
Migration, broadly defined as a permanent or semi-permanent
change of residence [11], is a critical driver of demographic change
[12,13]. Decisions to migrate are often conceptualized as reflecting a
combination of push factors associated with locations of origin, pull
factors associated with locations of destination, and intervening obsta
cles that prevent or delay migration [11]. Recent theories on migration
at the individual level are often couched within a framework of rational
choice that reflects the push/pull factors individuals take into account,
as well as intervening obstacles [1,11,14–16]. Prominent among such
frameworks is the focus on economic incentives, in which a dearth of
opportunities at an individual’s place of origin (i.e., push factors) are
juxtaposed with ample opportunities in potential destinations (i.e., pull
factors). This is in line with findings from studies of internal migration in
Indonesia that found that economic factors were foremost in predicting
migration during the 20th century [17,18]. Other studies have noted a
pattern of internal, and often circular migration within Indonesia
[18–21]. As noted by Lindquist [22]; these patterns are captured by the
verb “merantau”, which is suggestive of relocation with a somewhat
vague livelihood purpose while maintaining the possibility of periodic
return to one’s place of origin. Core frameworks for return migration
likewise recognize the importance of economic incentives [23–26], but
some also allow for other factors such as geographic, social and political
context to play important roles [23,27]. While general migration the
ories provide a helpful starting point, theories concerning migration in
the context of disasters from natural hazards require further refinement.
Although migrants in these contexts are still seeking to maximize life
outcomes, the primary goal in these situations is often the maintenance
of life itself. As such, the factors and mechanism at play deserve further
specification.

2.3. Recovery aid and migration status
In the context of disasters, governments and NGOs have the potential
to act as intervening agents that either inhibit or facilitate migration,
both by creating policies concerning return migration [32], and by the
extent to which they offer aid to help return migrants reestablish
themselves [34]. Herein we opt to focus on the effects of recovery aid on
migration.
Federal and international aid can be an incentive for households to
remain in their localities rather than migrate away from disaster-prone
areas [38]. After a tornado struck North-Central Bangladesh in 1996,
decisions to remain in original communities were strongly affected by
recovery aid resulting in minimal outmigration [39]. Likewise, after
another tornado in 2004, the vast majority of people affected by the
disaster still chose to remain in the area [40]. For the most part, recovery
aid from government agencies and NGOs in these instances was
distributed to households in an equitable manner and surpassed the cost
of the damages suffered, thus encouraging those affected by the tor
nadoes to remain in their communities [40]. Similarly, aid packages
were offered as incentives to households and businesses in an effort to
curb outmigration after a series of earthquakes hit Christchurch, New
Zealand between 2010 and 2011. The vast majority of businesses and
organizations chose to remain in Christchurch rather than relocate [41,
42]. These examples indicate that post-disaster aid can create incentives
for people to stay in their original communities. Sometimes aid does not
act as an incentive to resettle, and can delay recovery processes.
Households affected by the 2004 tsunami in Thailand received an
adequate amount of aid, but still had a slow recovery [43]. Researchers
believe recovery was stalled due to a excess of organizations and

2.2. Disasters from natural hazards and migration
Understanding of migration decisions in the wake of disasters ne
cessitates the consideration of broader macro-level context, particularly
the significance of ecological pushes that encourage people to migrate
2
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participants in the recovery process and a lack of coordination between
them [43].
Alternatively, recovery aid has also succeeded as a tool for encour
aging outmigration from hazardous areas. After massive flooding hit
Malaysia, relocation plans were designed to encourage people to move
out of flood-prone areas [44]. Because of the high cost of migration,
rural peasants were unlikely to migrate if aid was not guaranteed. If aid
was guaranteed in the form of a job, home, and/or lands outside of their
communities and outside the disaster zone, the people from affected
regions were highly likely to migrate [44]. However, because a large
number of people were effected by floods, the government was unable to
supply enough aid to encourage everyone to leave the hazardous
peninsula, resulting in minimal migration [44]. Additionally, a study
done on settlement abandonment in Montserrat after a volcanic eruption
examined migration and noted that rebuilding and relocation would not
have been possible without financial aid from the UK government [45].
For half of the island population, the aid offered by the UK encouraged
them to relocate off the island [46]. Of those individuals that chose to
migrate, approximately half relocated to other Caribbean islands and
half resettled to Great Britain [46]. Thus, aid packages have in some
instances been used successfully to encourage people to leave their
residence.
Resettlement after a disaster in a developing country can be tem
porary, especially if resettlement areas are not created with culturally
sensitive and community centered designs and processes [47,48].
Post-disaster resettlement is approached two ways–either top down or
bottom up [49], and successful resettlement involves coordination be
tween multiple stakeholder and community members [48]. For
example, a study examining the resettlement of two fishing villages in
Tamilnadu, India, found that housing design, location, clustering, allo
cation process, distance from previous town, and public space allocation
all impacted resettlement success. To avoid temporary resettlement,
local needs of accessibility, family typology, proximity to livelihood, and
creation of intentional public space with landmarks should be addressed
[47]. Another study found that when deciding whether to relocate or
move back, tsunami risk was only a minor concern for displaced Indo
nesians; concerns about costs of rent, land prices, and distance from
work were most pressing [49]. Thus, often times for people who expe
rience disaster in a developing country, resettlement is only temporary
as other livelihood needs lead people to abandon inadequate resettle
ment places.
Recovery aid may encourage outmigration when it is slow to reach
geographically isolated locations. In Kenya and Somalia, rural and
pastoral victims of drought migrated towards towns and city centers
because these locations offered food aid and a chance to diversify their
livelihood, protecting them from future disasters [50]. Along the same
lines, when post-disaster recovery is lacking nationwide, people tend to
migrate towards cities. In Ethiopia during times of food shortages,
households did not have access to needed aid [51]. Family members
choose to migrate to cities and towns where income was higher and job
opportunities were more abundant [51]. Additionally, after the
earthquake-avalanche in 1970 in Peru, rather than provide loans to
rebuild homes, the government chose to build temporary houses and
distribute them on a first come first serve basis [52]. The temporary
housing, as well as the higher wages promised by the reconstruction
committee, attracted increased rural migration. Rural peasant migration
continued to city areas where aid was provided even after permanent
housing was established and rural non-homeowners were given lowest
priority (first, second, and third priority going to landowners and
renters) [52].
The findings from these studies suggest that recovery aid can suc
cessfully function as a tool for influencing migration decisions, both for
increasing probability of return migration as well as for outmigration,
depending on how it is organized and distributed. This is particularly the
case for cash transfers and other forms of financial recovery aid.

Fig. 1. Mt. Merapi, Indonesia. Located in Central Java province and the
Special Region of Yogyakarta.

2.4. Migration in context: geography, ethnicity, and recovery aid
Mt. Merapi is located in the central region of Java, Indonesia, the
most highly populated island on the planet, with an average population
density of 1000 persons per square kilometer (see Fig. 1). Of interest to
this investigation, the population density within a 15 km radius of Mt.
Merapi ranges from 0 to 5000 per square kilometer. Within this
geographic area, roughly 98% of the population are ethnic Javanese
[58]. A common Javanese proverb, ‘Sedumuk batuk senyari bumi’, is
interpreted to mean that ‘dignity and land are things to strive for’. The
proverb highlights the place attachment that Javanese people have to
their land and community.
This attachment has been highlighted as part of the explanation for
some Merapi residents choosing to return to their original villages
despite the well known risks associated with living on the slopes of the
volcano [8,9]. In line with this, past studies have documented multiple
area in Indonesia where residents, in spite of well-documented risks and
official relocation policies, are reluctant to move [7,10,59,60]. Of
particular note to our study, Sontosudarmo [10] and Amin et al. [7]
have showed that, though threatened by the eruption of Mt. Merapi that
takes place periodically every 4–5 years, residents choose to remain in
the area. As Amin et al. [7]; 35) explains, residents “understand that
disaster is something dangerous but an attempt to leave their place is not
something they have to do because they have an attachment to Merapi
as a place of origin, where they gain a sense of comfort and safety.” Thus
emerges a pattern of return migration in which displaced residents
persist in returning to their communities and homes once the immediate
risks of a disaster subside.
However, recognizing that these patterns of return migration likely
increase the risk for future disaster events in the area surrounding Mt.
Merapi, BNPB, in collaboration with other government agencies,
endeavored to reorganize residential areas for the purpose of hazard
mitigation in the aftermath of the 2010 eruptions. For this purpose, a
risk analysis was carried out that identified the southern slopes of Mt.
Merapi as those at highest risk [8] and in line with these findings, the
government sought to encourage villagers living along Mt. Merapi’s
southern slopes to relocate to less hazardous areas. With this goal in
mind, the central government, through BNPB, promised to give recovery
assistance to victims of the disaster. The total amount of recovery
assistance was based on the level of damages that an individu
al/household experienced in connection to the disaster. Damage level
was classified into mild, moderate or completely destroyed. People
whose houses were completely destroyed were to be relocated and
receive permanent housing. While waiting to receive the promised re
covery assistance, people lived in temporary housing or shelters.
Disaster victims were given a transition period of two years during
3
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which time they could stay in their temporary residence, after that, they
would have to make a decision whether or not they were willing to
relocate.
2.4.1. Financial recovery aid: evidence of efficacy
Cash transfers and other forms of financial recovery aid can be
effective forms of recovery aid in general, as it can help people meet
their immediate needs in the wake of a disaster or crisis [53,54]. Studies
evaluating the relative efficacy of cash based recovery aid indicate that
these interventions can, under the proper circumstances, effectively
achieve a wide range of objectives; e.g., improving access to food and
thereby helping families smooth consumption patterns, improving ac
cess to shelter, and reducing the extent to which families rely upon
negative coping strategies during a crisis (e.g., dietary restriction or
child labor) [53,55]. However, its relative efficacy is context specific and
depends upon the type of financial aid, its relative value, who are the
targeted recipients, how the recovery aid intervention is organized, and
ultimately the effectiveness of implementing the intervention [53–57].
Moreover, it depends upon broader contexts such as the continued
presence of markets in which the financial aid can be used to obtain a
variety of goods or services.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of financial recovery aid is that it is a
flexible tool for improving the welfare of individuals and households
that empowers them to meet their specific needs based upon their own
assessment of what those needs are at the time [53–55]. As Johnson and
Krishnamurthy [54] highlight, “Extending the freedom to choose puts
critical decisions about household needs and investments squarely in the
hands of the household, whose members are in theory best placed to
assess the needs that are most pressing at a particular point in time (e.g.
consumption smoothing in order to invest in fodder for livestock).” The
downside to this increased autonomy is the loss of control on the part of
the providing agency or organization over how the financial assets are
used, thus the increased popularity of “conditional cash transfers” that
stipulate specific behavioral requirements that must be met to qualify
for the assistance [54]. One possible application of such conditions is to
facilitate the resettlement of individuals and households out of hazard
ous areas.
In their review of evidence concerning the efficacy of social protec
tion programs to facilitate resilience to disaster, Johnson and Krishna
murthy [54]; 653) outline seven mechanisms through which cash based
social protection programs may facilitate migration. Of the seven pro
posed mechanisms, four are likely applicable to the present study. First,
these program may facilitate migrants in connecting with new labor
markets that are reliable and sustainable alternatives to those in their
sending communities–this is a particularly powerful mechanism for the
present study considering the role of place attachment in the pattern of
return migration in the Mt. Merapi area. Second, these programs can
help offset the opportunity costs of relocation such as compensation for
assets and incomes lost as a result of resettlement. Third, financial re
covery aid interventions can subsidize the actual costs of relocation; i.e.,
“cash and conditional cash transfers can be used to cover relevant costs
of moving family members and household possessions …” [54]; 653).
Finally, these programs can support the broader social networks, such as
the communities and local authorities tasked with receiving and reset
tling the displaced migrants.

Fig. 2. Regency of sleman.

the distribution of recovery assistance to victims of the disaster was
organized in part to create incentives for households to resettle out of
hazardous areas [8]. With this in mind, we propose the following
hypotheses:
1. The overall provision of recovery assistance will be associated with
resettlement.
2. Economic recovery assistance in the form of financial aid or re
mittances will create the strongest incentive for resettlement.
3. Aid “packages” that combine multiple forms of assistance—e.g,
financial, food, health, or remittances––may create stronger in
centives for resettlement compared to any type of aid provided in
isolation as they may more comprehensively address costs of reset
tling to new locations.
4. Data and methods
To address our research questions, we drew on data from the
“Community Recovery after a Natural Disaster: A Survey of Commu
nities Affected by Mt. Merapi Eruptions” study. The survey question
naire used in the study was developed in an iterative process by a
research team including members from Indonesia and the United States.
After initial development in English, the questionnaire was translated
into Bahasa Indonesia by a translation team made up of research team
members who were native speakers of either Bahasa Indonesia or En
glish, but who were also fluent in their non-native language of either
Bahasa Indonesia or English. The translation process included standard
translation/back-translation steps in an effort to increase the accuracy
and cultural appropriateness of the questionnaire. The data were
collected by student research assistants and faculty at the Institute of
Community Development Research Center, Yogyakarta, Indonesia. All
interactions between the researchers and respondents were carried out
in Bahasa Indonesia, and data were then translated into English and
entered into a database for further statistical analysis.
The study was conducted 16 months after the 2010 eruptions. It was
organized as a pilot study to document the experiences of victims of the
disaster; including their experiences related to disaster preparedness,
mitigation, and recovery, as well as their overall experience of the
emergency. This has important implications for the overall power, or
limitations, of the data collected to investigate migration in response to
the eruptions.

3. Summary & research hypotheses
The migration literature suggests that economics often plays an
important role in migration decisions. With regards to migration in the
context of disasters, the literature suggests that factors associated with
disasters (e.g., the extent of damage caused by the disaster) are associ
ated strongly with migration decisions. In addition, recovery aid may
also influence migration decisions. Depending on how it is organized
and distributed, recovery aid may increase the probability of return
migration or alternatively for outmigration. In the case of Mt. Merapi,
4
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Fig. 3. Migrations Flows from Sending to Receiving Villages. The respondents in our survey came from 50 sending villages prior to the evacuation order that
corresponded with the volcanic eruptions. The respondents were identified through our sampling procedure which first selected the 10 receiving villages.

4.1. Sampling procedures

severely damages were Girikerto Villages (Turi District), Hargobinangun
Village (Pakem District), Umbulharjo, Kepuharjo, Glagahharjo, Argo
mulyo Villages (Cangkringan District) and Sindumartani Village
(Ngemplak District). The villages considered as slightly affected were
Wonokerto Village (Turi District), Purwobinangun Village (Pakem Dis
trict), and the village of Wukirsari (Cangkringan District).

Respondent sampling was conducted with two specific aims in mind.
First, to create a sample that experienced varying levels of destruction.
Second, to create a sample that included respondents who were still
living in a disaster shelter, respondents who had moved home, and re
spondents who had moved on.
The Merapi eruptions struck five Regencies around the mountain:
Boyolali, Klaten, Magelang, and Muntilan located within Central Java
Province and Sleman Regency located within the Special Region of
Yogyakarta (See Fig. 1). The damages caused by the disaster varied from
one region to another. After taking into consideration time, costs, dis
tance, and that this would be a pilot project on disaster mitigation, ten
villages in Sleman Regency were chosen as the study location (See
Fig. 2). Those ten villages are spread across 4 districts: Turi, Ngemplak,
Cangkringan and Pakem.
The ten villages were selected based on the relative impact the
Merapi eruptions had on each village, which ranged from those most
severely affected to those only slightly affected. The villages classified as

4.2. Respondent selection
After establishing the sampling procedure, individual respondents
were selected to obtain a sample of those who still lived in a shelter,
those who had returned to their previous communities, and those who
had moved away. The method for respondent selection was similar to
the selection process used to identify villages and shelters within the
districts. Residences were selected starting from the northernmost part
of a village or shelter community and selection then moved from east to
west and gradually south. Within this process, households were chosen
randomly. The selection was conducted until there were 40 respondents
from one village, with one respondent per household (respondents were
5
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individuals that identified as head of household). By drawing re
spondents from 10 different villages or shelter communities, we ob
tained a total respondent sample of 400 (two respondents were removed
from the analytic sample because they were under the age of 18).
It is important to distinguish between the villages that respondents
were sampled from and their villages or towns of origin (e.g., their
“sending” village). The 398 respondents ultimately included in our an
alyses originated from 50 different villages or towns (See Fig. 3).
There is some overlap between the villages used for sampling and the
villages of origin due to the fact that a portion of the sample had
returned to their original village at the time of the survey, but many
were still displaced or had moved on to new locations. The distribution
of respondents from these various villages was such that roughly a third
of the sending villages were represented by only one person. In contrast,
many of the sending villages were represented by at least 10 respondents
and several villages had 15-20.
The sample procedures and protocol for respondent selection were
established with the goal of creating a sample representative of the
varying levels of destruction that respondents experienced from the
eruption. However, as a post-disaster study, we are unable to directly
assess the extent to which our sample is representative of the predisaster population. Some of the persons displaced by the eruption
may have migrated beyond the geographic scope of our study. While this
is a concern, qualitative data gathered through interviews and focus
groups suggest that the vast majority of displaced persons remained
within the geographic region surrounding Mr. Merapi, a pattern
consistent with research carried out by the Indonesian disaster man
agement agency BNPB [8] and documented in related studies [9]. In
addition, comparing demographic characteristics of our sample with
2010 census data for Indonesia [61] suggests that the distribution of
respondents within our sample is comparable to that in the Special Re
gion of Yogyakarta and similar to the general population of Indonesia
(see Appendix A). For example, our study sample almost matches the
population distribution of DI Yogyakarta in terms of religion and is
comparable to that for Indonesia overall. While our study sample had a
somewhat higher distribution of educational attainment in comparison
to the population of DI Yogyakarta, this differences is likely attributable
to the age distributions in our sample as educational attainment in DI
Yogyakarta decreases with age, so a younger sample in our data would
result in somewhat elevated percentages for education attainment.

yielded similar results.
The independent variables of interest were divided into three sets.
The first set included various types of recovery aid provided to house
holds. Regarding Financial Recovery Aid, respondents were asked: “Did
they or are they currently receiving any financial assistance from gov
ernment and/or nongovernmental organizations (excluding family and
friends)?” With respect to Food Recovery Aid, respondents were asked:
“Did they or are they currently receiving food assistance from govern
ment and/or nongovernmental organizations (exclude family and
friends)?” For Health Recovery Aid, respondents were asked: “Did they or
are they currently receiving healthcare/medical assistance from gov
ernment and or nongovernmental organizations (excluding family and
friends)?” Finally, for Remittances, respondents were asked: “Does the
household receive any money from people not living at their current
residence?” to assess the impact of monetary aid provided to the re
spondent’s household through their social network. Responses for all of
the recovery aid questions were coded into dichotomous variables (1 ¼
Ever Received). From these initial variables, three additional recovery
aid variables were constructed. Economic Recovery Assistance combined
Financial Recovery Aid with Remittances into a categorical variable coded
(1 ¼ None [reference category], 2 ¼ Both, 3 ¼ Remittances, 4 ¼
Financial Recovery Aid). Resource Recovery Assistance combined Food
Recovery Aid with Health Recovery Aid into a categorical variable coded
(1 ¼ None [reference category], 2 ¼ Both, 3 ¼ Health Recovery Aid, 4 ¼
Food Recovery Aid). Household Recovery Assistance1 combined all 4 types
of recovery aid into a categorical variable (0 ¼ None, 1 ¼ 1 Type of Aid,
2 ¼ 2 Types of Aid, 3 ¼ 3 Types of Aid, and 4 ¼ 4 Types of Aid).
A second set included measures for demographic characteristics and
place attachment, which often influence migration decisions [33,
62–64]. We measured Age as a categorical variable with six age groups
ranging from 1 ¼ 18–30 years old to 6 ¼ 70 þ years old (the first age
group, 18 to 30, was set as the reference category). Sex was included as a
dichotomous variable with 1 ¼ Male. Married was also included as a
dichotomous variable with 1 ¼ Married. Education was measured as a
categorical variable with 1 ¼ Primary School or Less, 2 ¼ Junior High
School, and 3 ¼ Senior High School and Beyond (the first education
group, Primary School or Less, was set as the reference category). Income
was measured as a categorical variable with 1 ¼ 0 to 500,000 Rupiah; 2
¼ 50,001 to 800,000 Rupiah; and 3 ¼ 800,001 to 1,000,000 Rupiah; and
4 ¼ 1,000,000 Rupiah and Beyond (the first income group, 0 to 500,000
Rupiah, was set as the reference category). Finally, as a proxy for
community attachment, Residence Duration was calculated by dividing
the total number of years lived in the previous community by the re
spondent’s age and then dichotomizing the results such that 1 ¼ whole
life, 0 ¼ other. We used this measure as prior research has indicated it is
a strong predictor of community attachment [65].
The third set of independent variables included measures of the level
of destruction experienced as a result of the volcano, which have been
found to influence migration decisions in the context of disasters [4,31,
36,37] and were the basis upon which recovery aid was distributed in
the aftermath of the Mt. Merapi eruptions. Residence Damaged or
Destroyed was measured as a dichotomous variable with 1 ¼ Yes. Envi
ronmental Hazards measured the number of various environmental
hazards the respondent’s household had experienced in the past year,
coded as a count variable ranging from one to three plus. The variable
Perceived Destruction measured a respondent’s perception of the total
damage that they experienced because of the volcanic eruption, coded as
a categorical variable with 1 ¼ Low (reference group), 2 ¼ Medium, and

4.3. Measures
The dependent variable in our analysis captured Migration Status in
terms of whether or not a respondent and/or his/her household were
displaced, in transition, had moved on, or had moved home at the time
that the surveys were collected (100% of our sample was originally
displaced due to an evacuation order). The variable was constructed
from responses to two questions in the survey: (1) Have they [the
respondent] returned to their previous community since the disaster?
(2) Do they [the respondent] currently live in temporary housing?
(shelter, barrack, government relocation site, etc.)? Using responses to
these questions, the following categories were constructed: (1) Moved
Home – respondents who indicated that they had returned to their pre
vious community and no longer living in temporary housing; (2) In
Transition – respondents who indicated that they had returned to their
previous community and were still living in temporary housing; (3)
Displaced – respondents who indicated that they had yet to return to
their previous community and were still living in temporary housing; (4)
Moved On – respondents who indicated that they had yet to return to
their previous community and no longer living in temporary housing.
Moved Home was set as the reference category in order to analyze what
types of recovery aid were associated with having moved home versus
remaining displaced, but also to analyze what types of recovery aid were
associated with having moved home versus having moved on. Addi
tional analyses, conducted with “displaced” set as the comparison group,

1
Early iterations of the analysis evaluated a three category version of this
variable wherein the final category was coded as “3þ” that had a larger number
of respondents. The results for this version did not vary substantially or
significantly from the 4 category version, and we opted to use the 4 category
version to demonstrate the overall pattern, while recognizing that the 4th
category was represented by a relatively small number of respondents (n ¼ 24).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics: Categorical variables.
level

Moved Home

In Transition

Moved On

Displaced

Total

190

24

22

162

398

138 (72.6)
52 (27.4)

18 (75.0)
6 (25.0)

6 (27.3)
16 (72.7)

53 (32.7)
109 (67.3)

215 (54.0)
183 (46.0)

88 (46.3)
102 (53.7)

11 (45.8)
13 (54.2)

7 (31.8)
15 (68.2)

29 (17.9)
133 (82.1)

135 (33.9)
263 (66.1)

77 (40.5)
113 (59.5)

12 (50.0)
12 (50.0)

8 (36.4)
14 (63.6)

47 (29.0)
115 (71.0)

144 (36.2)
254 (63.8)

159 (83.7)
31 (16.3)

22 (91.7)
2 (8.3)

18 (81.8)
4 (18.2)

145 (89.5)
17 (10.5)

344 (86.4)
54 (13.6)

119 (62.6)
12 (6.3)
19 (10.0)
40 (21.1)

16 (66.7)
0 (0.0)
2 (8.3)
6 (25.0)

5 (22.7)
3 (13.6)
1 (4.5)
13 (59.1)

50 (30.9)
14 (8.6)
3 (1.9)
95 (58.6)

190 (47.7)
29 (7.3)
25 (6.3)
154 (38.7)

57 (30.0)
82 (43.2)
20 (10.5)
31 (16.3)

8 (33.3)
9 (37.5)
4 (16.7)
3 (12.5)

4 (18.2)
11 (50.0)
4 (18.2)
3 (13.6)

25 (15.4)
111 (68.5)
22 (13.6)
4 (2.5)

94 (23.6)
213 (53.5)
50 (12.6)
41 (10.3)

51 (26.8)
35 (18.4)
57 (30.0)
39 (20.5)
8 (4.2)

6 (25.0)
5 (20.8)
11 (45.8)
2 (8.3)
0 (0.0)

2 (9.1)
4 (18.2)
6 (27.3)
7 (31.8)
3 (13.6)

21 (13.0)
17 (10.5)
28 (17.3)
83 (51.2)
13 (8.0)

80 (20.1)
61 (15.3)
102 (25.6)
131 (32.9)
24 (6.0)

18–30
31–40
41–50
51–60
61–70
70þ

27 (14.2)
42 (22.1)
46 (24.2)
48 (25.3)
19 (10.0)
8 (4.2)

3 (12.5)
1 (4.2)
8 (33.3)
5 (20.8)
5 (20.8)
2 (8.3)

7 (31.8)
6 (27.3)
6 (27.3)
1 (4.5)
1 (4.5)
1 (4.5)

26 (16.0)
42 (25.9)
30 (18.5)
37 (22.8)
20 (12.3)
7 (4.3)

63 (15.8)
91 (22.9)
90 (22.6)
91 (22.9)
45 (11.3)
18 (4.5)

Female
Male

75 (39.5)
115 (60.5)

6 (25.0)
18 (75.0)

14 (63.6)
8 (36.4)

61 (37.7)
101 (62.3)

156 (39.2)
242 (60.8)

No
Yes

17 (8.9)
173 (91.1)

1 (4.2)
23 (95.8)

2 (9.1)
20 (90.9)

24 (14.8)
138 (85.2)

44 (11.1)
354 (88.9)

Primary School or Less
Junior High School
Senior High School
Beyond High School

66 (34.7)
37 (19.5)
70 (36.8)
17 (8.9)

9 (37.5)
7 (29.2)
7 (29.2)
1 (4.2)

7 (31.8)
6 (27.3)
9 (40.9)
0 (0.0)

55 (34.0)
57 (35.2)
45 (27.8)
5 (3.1)

137 (34.4)
107,926.9)
131 (32.9)
23 (5.8)

50 (26.3)
57 (30.0)
35 (18.4)
48 (25.3)

6 (25.0)
5 (20.8)
9 (37.5)
4 (16.7)

5 (22.7)
2 (9.1)
3 (13.6)
12 (54.5)

48 (29.6)
44 (27.2)
43 (26.5)
27 (16.7)

109 (27.4)
108 (27.1)
90 (22.6)
91 (22.9)

81 (42.6)
109 (57.4)

9 (37.5)
15 (62.5)

14 (63.6)
8 (36.4)

74 (45.7)
88 (54.3)

178 (44.7)
220 (55.3)

80 (42.1)
91 (47.9)
19 (10.0)

11 (45.8)
10 (41.7)
3 (12.5)

6 (27.3)
13 (59.1)
3 (13.6)

49 (30.2)
41 (25.3)
72 (44.4)

146 (36.7)
155 (38.9)
97 (24.4)

168 (88.4)
15 (7.9)
7 (3.7)

14 (58.3)
8 (33.3)
2 (8.3)

14 (63.6)
5 (22.7)
3 (13.6)

13 (8.0)
20 (12.3)
129 (79.6)

209 (52.5)
48 (12.1)
141 (35.4)

59 (31.1)
131 (68.9)

7 (29.2)
17 (70.8)

5 (22.7)
17 (77.3)

55 (34.0)
107 (66.0)

126 (31.7)
272 (68.3)

150 (78.9)
40 (21.1)

14 (58.3)
10 (41.7)

13 (59.1)
9 (40.9)

16 (9.9)
146 (90.1)

193 (48.5)
205 (51.5)

n
Financial Recovery Aid (%)
Not Received
Received
Health Recovery Aid (%)
Not Received
Received
Food Recovery Aid (%)
Not Received
Received
Remittances (%)
Not Received
Received
Economic Recovery Assistance (%)
None
Both
Remittances
Financial Recovery Aid
Resources Recovery Assistance (%)
None
Both
Health Recovery Aid
Food Recovery Aid
Household Recovery Assistance (%)
0
1
2
3
4
Age (%)

Sex (%)
Married (%)
Education (%)

Income (%)

0 - 500,000
500,001–800,000
800,001 - 1,000,000
1,000,000þ
Residence Duration (%)
Other
Whole Life
Environmental Hazards (%)
1
2
3
Preceived Destruction (%)
Low
Medium
High
Strongly Fears Nature’s Wrath (%)
No
Yes
Residence Damaged (%)
No
Yes
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3 ¼ High. Fears Nature’s Wrath was coded as a dichotomous variable (1
¼ Strongly Fears Nature’s Wrath).

Table 2
Summary of relative risk ratios from multinomial logistic regression models as
core results for migration status analyses.

5. Analytic strategy

Dependent variable: Migration Status

To address our research questions, we evaluated associations be
tween respondents’ migration status and various forms of recovery aid
using multinomial logistic regression models. Given that 100% of the
sample was displaced and only part of the sample subsequently received
aid, these analyses were used in an attempt to identify the treatment
effect of the various forms of recovery aid. The analyses were conducted
in four stages.
In Stage One, each type of recovery aid was analyzed in isolation,
with two separate models estimated for each type of aid. The first model
adjusted for factors that are often associated with migration in nondisaster settings (i.e., respondent age, sex, education, income, and
marital status). The second model adjusted for these factors as well as for
factors that are often associated with migration in the context of di
sasters (e.g., perceptions of the severity of the disaster, whether or not a
respondent’s home was destroyed, whether or not they fear the wrath of
nature, and community/place attachment). Only results for the fully
adjusted models are presented. For Stage Two, all of the forms of re
covery aid were included in one model–these estimates are thus adjusted
for factors that are often associated with migration in non-disaster set
tings, factors that are often associated with migration in the context of
disasters, and adjusted for other types of recover aid that a household
may or may not have received. Stage Three grouped the different types of
recovery aid into two categorical variables: economic recovery assis
tance and resource recovery assistance. Finally, Stage Four assessed the
effect of “aid packages” in which households received varying amounts
of recovery assistance packages.
Across the analyses, possible collinearity among independent vari
ables was assessed using VIF values, all of which were below 2.5, which
were deemed sufficiently low to not raise concern. Regression co
efficients were converted to relative risk ratios and organized into data
visualizations that included 95% confidence intervals using the R sta
tistical programming environment [66].

In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Stage 1: Aid Specific Analyses
Financial Recovery Aid

0.59 (0.59)

Food Recovery Aid
Health Recovery Aid

0.70 (0.48)
0.86 (0.51)

11.62***
(0.62)
1.58 (0.52)
2.45 (0.57)

Remittances
Stage 2: Aid Adjusted Analyses
Financial Recovery Aid

0.38 (0.85)

1.74 (0.69)

5.09***
(0.43)
1.68 (0.42)
4.16**
(0.49)
0.87 (0.59)

0.64 (0.63)

Food Recovery Aid
Health Recovery Aid
Remittances
Stage 3: Grouped Aid Analyses
Economic Recovery Assistance:
Both
Economic Recovery Assistance:
Remittances
Economic Recovery Assistance:
Financial Aid
Resource Recovery Assistance:
Both
Resource Recovery Assistance:
Health Aid
Resource Recovery Assistance:
Food Aid
Stage 4: Aid Packages Analyses
Household Recovery Assistance:
1
Household Recovery Assistance:
2
Household Recovery Assistance:
3
Household Recovery Assistance:
4

0.73 (0.59)
1.14 (0.60)
0.36 (0.87)

15.27***
(0.69)
0.38 (0.68)
2.93 (0.72)
1.36 (0.76)

5.03***
(0.49)
0.48 (0.54)
4.16* (0.57)
0.60 (0.63)

0.00***
(0.0000)
0.60 (0.90)

17.91**
(1.00)
1.32 (1.27)

4.34 (0.84)

0.68 (0.60)
0.69 (0.58)

11.72***
(0.68)
2.81 (0.69)

4.65***
(0.46)
3.49* (0.55)

0.87 (0.80)

3.13 (0.89)

3.36 (0.73)

0.56 (0.89)

1.60 (0.92)

0.46 (1.00)

1.54 (0.74)

3.20 (1.03)

2.87 (0.74)

1.36 (0.64)

3.01 (0.93)

1.50 (0.66)

0.27 (0.97)

8.14* (0.96)

0.00***
(0.0000)

34.96**
(1.25)

6.33**
(0.64)
10.61*
(1.02)

Note:*p<0.05;

0.38 (1.08)

**p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

6. Results

and 20% received none whatsoever.

6.1. Descriptive statistics

6.2. Stage 1: aid specific analyses

The majority of respondents had either already moved home (48%)
or were still displaced (41%) at the time of data collection (see Table 1
for descriptive statistics). In contrast, roughly 6% of respondents were
still in transition and another roughly 6% had moved on or relocated to a
new area. This distribution is consistent with the aforementioned ten
dency for individuals/households living near Mt. Merapi to return to
their original communities after eruptions, despite awareness that
Merapi is an active volcano that erupts regularly [7–10].
With regards to specific types of recovery aid, 46% reported
receiving Financial Recovery Aid, 66% reported receiving Health Recovery
Aid, 64% reported receiving Food Recovery Aid, and only 14% reported
receiving Remittances from their social networks. Concerning Economic
Recovery Assistance, only 7% of respondents reported receiving both
Financial Recovery Aid and Remittances; 39% reported receiving only
Financial Recovery Aid; 6.3% reported receiving only Remittances; and
48% reported receiving no Economic Recovery Assistance. In terms of
Resource Recovery Assistance, 54% of respondents reported receiving
both Health Recovery Aid and Food Recovery Aid; 10% reported receiving
only Food Recovery Aid; 13% reported receiving only Health Recovery
Aid; and 24% reported receiving no Resource Recovery Assistance.
Regarding Household Recovery Assistance as “aid packages,” only 6% of
respondents reported receiving all 4 types of recovery assistance; 33%
reported receiving 3 types of recovery assistance; 26% received 2 types
of recovery assistance; 15% received only 1 types of recovery assistance;

A summary of core results for analyses evaluating the relationship
between Migration Status and the various types of recovery aid are pre
sented as Relative Risk Ratios (RRR) in Table 2 and presented visually
with 95% confidence intervals in Figs. 4–6. Tables containing complete
information for all analyses are presented in Appendix B.
Recovery aid was distributed by government and non-government
organizations to households in the form of financial aid as well as “in
kind” resources such as food and health aid. After adjusting for factors
typically associated with migration under non-disaster circumstances as
well as in the context of disasters (Stage 1), respondents whose house
hold received Financial Recovery Aid were more likely to have Moved On
(RRR ¼ 11.62; p < 0.001), compared to having Moved Home. Financial
Recovery Aid was the only type of recovery aid in Stage 1 that resulted in
an association that was both positive and statistically significant with
regards to respondents who reported that they had moved on. Re
spondents whose household received Food Recovery Aid were more likely
to have Moved On (RRR ¼ 1.58), compared to having Moved Home.
Likewise, respondents whose household received Health Recovery Aid
were more likely to have Moved On (RRR ¼ 2.45) compared to having
Moved Home. However, the results for food and health aid were not
statistically significant. In addition to recovery aid received from gov
ernment and non-government organizations, some households reported
that they received remittances from their social network. Respondents
whose household received Remittances were more likely to have Moved
8
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Fig. 4. Aid Specific Relative Risk Ratios for Migration Status. Financial Recovery Aid clearly has a strong, positive association with the migration status of having
moved on. While still demonstrating positive associations, no other type of recovery aid is statistically significant with regards to the migration status of having
moved on.

On (RRR ¼ 1.74), compared to having Moved Home. However, these
results were not statistically significant.

to have Moved On, compared to having Moved Home. However, as
before, these results were not statistically significant.

6.3. Stage 2: aid adjusted analyses

6.5. Stage 4: aid packages analyses

After adjusting for other types of recovery aid in addition to other
control variables, the association between respondents whose household
received Financial Recovery Aid and having Moved On increased in
strength (RRR ¼ 15.27; p<0.001). This association as well as the asso
ciations between other types of recovery aid are visualized in Fig. 4,
which clearly indicates that after adjusting for the other types of re
covery aid, Financial Recovery Aid was the only type of recovery aid that
resulted in an association that was both positive and statistically sig
nificant with regards to respondents who reported that they had moved
on.

Ultimately, the extent to which households received recovery aid
varied substantially; i.e., 80 respondents indicated that their household
had received no recovery aid whatsoever, 61 respondents indicated that
their household received only 1 type of aid, 102 respondents indicated
that their household received 2 types of aid, 131 respondents indicated
that their household received 3 types of aid, and 24 respondents indi
cated that their household had received every type of aid. In terms of
these “aid packages”, after adjusting for other factors, respondents
whose household received every type of aid, compared to those whose
household received none, were the most likely to have Moved On (RRR
¼ 34.96; p<0.01), compared to having Moved Home. Similarly, re
spondents whose household received 3 types of aid, compared to those
whose household received none, were more likely to have Moved On
(RRR ¼ 8.14; p<0.05) compared to having Moved Home (see also Fig. 6).

6.4. Stage 3: grouped aid analyses
In the grouped analyses, respondents whose household received the
combination of both types of Economic Recovery Assistance were more
likely to have Moved On (RRR ¼ 17.91; p<0.01), compared to having
Moved Home. Similarly, respondents whose household received only
Financial Recovery Aid were more likely to have Moved On (RRR ¼ 11.72;
p<0.001), compared to having Moved Home. As Fig. 5 clearly indicates,
both of these results were statistically significant. However, while re
spondents whose household only received Remittances were still more
likely to have Moved On (RRR ¼ 1.32), compared to having Moved Home,
these results were not statistically significant. Respondents whose
household received the combination of both types of Resource Recovery
Assistance were more likely to have Moved On (RRR ¼ 2.81), compared
to having Moved Home. As before, respondents whose household
received only Food Recovery Aid or Health Recovery Aid were more likely

7. Discussion
Our objective in this study was to explore the extent to which re
covery aid in the aftermath of a disaster may influence Migration Status.
As such, we note several issues requiring further investigation and policy
consideration. However, before discussing these considerations, we
stress that there is need for caution in interpreting these results–they are
associations and our ability to make causal inference is limited. Our
interpretation that these associations suggest possible treatment effects
is based primarily upon the temporal sequence of events. However, these
limitations acknowledged, we anticipate that these preliminary findings
have policy implications for government and non-government
9
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Fig. 5. Grouped Aid Relative Risk Ratios for Migration Status. Economic Recovery Aid: Both and Economic Recovery Aid: Financial Recovery Aid clearly have strong,
positive associations with the migration status of having moved on. While still demonstrating positive associations, no other combination of recovery aid is sta
tistically significant with regards to the migration status of having moved on.

organizations seeking to influence how populations resettle in the
aftermath of a disaster–especially for organizations operating to reduce
risks in the Merapi area. Furthermore, these preliminary findings can
help guide future research; particularly research focused on the welldocumented risks and reoccurring impacts of eruptions form Mt. Merapi.
With respect to the broad exploration of the extent to which recovery
aid in the aftermath of a disaster may influence Migration Status, all of
the different types of recovery aid analyzed were positively associated
with respondents reporting that their household had moved on
compared to moved home, which is consistent with the first of our hy
potheses. However, of the different types of recovery aid analyzed, only
Financial Recovery Aid was both associated strongly with having moved
on and statistically significant when analyzed by itself (consistent with
our second hypothesis). Moreover, the strength of this association
increased after adjusting for whether or not a household had received
other types of recovery aid. The grouped analyses add some nuance to
the aid specific results by demonstrating that the combination of
Financial Recovery Aid with Remittances resulted in an association with
having moved on that was even stronger when both types of aid were
received as opposed to when just Financial Recovery Aid was received.
The caveat for future researchers and policy makers is that while the
combined effect was stronger, the difference was not statistically sig
nificant (the confidence intervals overlapped). This nuance was
extended in the “aid packages” analyses wherein the results suggest that
the “aid packages” that were relatively more effective were those that
included most, if not all, of the different types of recovery aid, a finding
that is consistent with our third and final hypothesis. This suggests that
while food and health recovery aid as well as remittances may not have
been sufficient in and of themselves to increase resettlement, they may
enhance the effect of financial recovery aid. Given the interest to facil
itate household relocation to safer areas as a means of risk reduction in
the region [8,9], these results suggest that the provision of financial

assistance is likely the best type of recovery aid for achieving this
objective. However, policy makers should consider that it is possible that
providing financial assistance in combination with other recovery re
sources may yield even stronger incentives for resettlement overall.
While we believe this study has policy implications and also con
tributes to the literature on migration in the aftermath of a disaster, we
recognize that it is not without limitation. The data used were part of a
pilot study organized to document in detail the experiences of victims of
the disaster. This affects our ability to leverage these data for statistical
analyses investigating migration status as this was not the main purpose
of the data. In addition, as a pilot study, only a relatively small sample of
data was collected. This limits the statistical power of our analyses such
that some indicators may have had stronger statistical significance (as
well as tighter confidence intervals) if the study size was larger. Like
wise, more nuanced analyses could have been conducted; e.g., a full
categorical breakdown of different aid package combinations rather
than a count of the various categories.
There is also the potential for bias within our data, as discussed in
detail in the methods section. Sample bias may exist as our sample only
included the geographic region surrounding Mt. Merapi. It is possible
that some of the persons displaced by the eruption migrated beyond the
geographic scope of our study. It is unfortunate that for individuals or
households who may have moved further away, we are unable to assess
whether or not they were more likely to have experienced more severe
consequences of the disaster compared to those who remained in the
same geographic region or if they were they more likely to have had the
means to resettle further from their original home. It is difficult to
directly assess how this potential bias may affect our results, but given
our theoretical framework we anticipate that their absence from the
study results in more conservative estimates. It is possible that there is
also recall bias within our data due to the timing of data collection.
However, given that data collection for all respondents occurred in the
10

J.A. Muir et al.

International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 46 (2020) 101478

Fig. 6. Aid Packages Relative Risk Ratios for Migration Status. Household Recovery Aid: 4 and Household Recovery Aid: 3 clearly have strong, positive associations
with the migration status of having moved on. No other combination of recovery aid is statistically significant with regards to the migration status of having
moved on.

same time period, we anticipate that any recall bias within our data is
non-differential.
Finally, as with the majority of disasters from natural hazards, these
findings come from a specific event, occurring at a specific time and in a
specific location. This is important given that the destruction resulting
from Mt. Merapi’s eruption only became a “natural disaster” through
interaction with local social systems. As Perry states, “It is not the hur
ricane wind or storm surge that makes the disaster; these are the sources
of the damage. The disaster is the impact on individual coping patterns
and the inputs and outputs of social systems” [67]; 12). In as much as a
disaster is a social phenomenon [67,68] that is inherently local, it is
difficult to gauge the extent to which our findings are generalizable
beyond the context of Java, Indonesia. At a minimum, these findings
could inform other research studies through incorporation into a future
systematic review or meta analysis of indicators of return migration in
the aftermath of disasters from natural hazards.
Despite these limitations, we have endeavored to provide meaningful
insights to potential associations between various types of recovery aid
and migration status in the aftermath of a disaster. Moreover, as we
move beyond this pilot study to continue conducting research in the
region, these results, as well as lessons learned while conducting this
pilot study, will inform our efforts to better understand the social ram
ifications of Mt. Merapi’s frequent eruptions–the most recent of which
occurred earlier this year [69].

migration is so prominent that the Indonesian government has
endeavored to create incentives to encourage resettlement to areas that
are less hazardous, but still in the general Mt. Merapi area. This pattern
is perhaps somewhat unique, as it is in contrast to findings from research
studies from other geographic areas and context that found that post
disaster, more educated people tended to move to cities in their same
region, which resulted in a secondary disaster in the form of brain drain.
This migration pattern could be due to the limited types of jobs in local
areas post-disaster and need to diversify family income [70].
This study evaluated multiple types of recovery aid in order to
identify which types may play a role in influencing migration decisions
in the aftermath of a disaster. While return migration in these circum
stances may constitute an opportunity for migrants to reclaim what they
lost and begin anew, classic studies on the effects of disasters from
natural hazards suggest that the process of starting over is difficult and
life is never truly the same [34,71]. The trip home is but the first step in
regaining what was lost, and therefore, return may not be the best
choice. Moreover, there is apparent interest in the current context to
help the most vulnerable relocate to safer locations. Given these cir
cumstances, future research should evaluate the effects of return
migration on life outcomes, such as health and quality of life. While
buildings can be rebuilt, the same is not always true of the past [71], and
perhaps for some it would indeed be better to move on rather than move
back–especially in a world where disasters from natural hazards are an
ever more frequent reality.

8. Conclusion

Ethical standards

Despite the well-known danger, the area surrounding the mountain
remains densely populated and the site of frequent return migrations as
households persist in returning to their original communities once the
dangers associated with an eruption have subsided [7–10]. Our overall
results are consistent with this documented trend. This pattern of return
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missed, hoser! We are also grateful for the contributions of Rilee Buttars
and Alex Currit to the data gathering process and to the many research
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Appendix A

Table 3
Statistics for Comparing Sample to General Population

Demographic Characteristics:
Marital Status
Single
Married
Divorced
Widowed
Religion
Islam
Christian
Other
Education Attainment
None
Some Primary
Lower Secondary
Upper Secondary and Beyond

Study Sample
%

Special Region of Yogyakarta
%

Indonesia
%

3.5
89.0
2.0
5.5

32.6
59.0
1.4
6.8

31.9
60.5
1.8
5.5

92.2
7.5
0.3

92.0
7.5
0.5

87.2
9.8
3.0

5.0
29.6
26.7
38.7

10.0
36.5
16.5
37.0

21.8
28.5
20.2
29.5

Comparison data obtained from Indonesia’s 2010 census [61], The marital status of the study sample is comparable to percentages
reported for DI Yogyakarta and Indonesia overall in terms of divorced and widowed. The higher proportion of married compared to
single is likely attributable to respondent status as head of household. In terms of religion, our study sample almost matches the
population distribution DI Yogyakarta and is comparable to that for Indonesia overall. Our study sample has a somewhat higher
distribution of educational attainment in comparison to the population of DI Yogyakarta, an areas that is known for having higher
education attainment compared to national averages [29]. This differences is likely attributable to the age distributions in our sample
as educational attainment in DI Yogyakarta decreases with age, so a younger sample in our data would result in somewhat elevated
percentages for education attainment.
Note: Columns may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

Appendix B

Table 4
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Migration Status and Financial Recovery Aid
Dependent variable:
Predicting Migration Status
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Financial Recovery Aid
Age: 31–40
Age: 41–50
Age: 51–60
Age: 61–70
Age: 70þ
Sex (Male)
Marital Status (Married)
Junior High School
Senior High School þ
Income: 500,001–800,000 RP
Income: 800,001–1,000,000 RP
Income: 1,000,000 þ RP
Residence Duration
Environmental Hazards
Medium Destruction
High Destruction
Fears Nature’s Wrath
Residence Damaged
Constant

0.59 (0.59)
0.20 (1.22)
1.03 (0.81)
0.64 (0.85)
1.34 (0.89)
1.92 (1.14)
1.85 (0.69)
3.84 (1.20)
1.48 (0.65)
0.64 (0.63)
1.01 (0.71)
2.25 (0.65)
0.81 (0.74)
0.90 (0.60)
0.68 (0.37)
8.30** (0.73)
3.32 (1.03)
0.82 (0.55)
1.26 (0.63)
0.04* (1.53)

11.62*** (0.62)
0.63 (0.75)
0.34 (0.74)
0.04** (1.22)
0.23 (1.25)
0.41 (1.35)
0.74 (0.82)
0.47 (0.98)
0.90 (0.83)
0.37 (0.70)
0.33 (0.96)
0.82 (0.86)
4.89* (0.72)
0.44 (0.82)
0.97 (0.41)
2.37 (0.77)
4.44 (0.97)
3.41 (0.66)
1.29 (0.67)
0.10 (1.40)

5.09*** (0.43)
0.95 (0.67)
0.86 (0.67)
0.57 (0.70)
0.73 (0.78)
0.27 (1.05)
1.85 (0.57)
0.47 (0.61)
1.06 (0.56)
0.43 (0.53)
0.77 (0.57)
1.08 (0.58)
0.75 (0.61)
0.37 (0.55)
1.12 (0.28)
5.73** (0.57)
110.37*** (0.63)
1.63 (0.46)
3.98** (0.50)
0.07** (1.01)

Akaike Inf. Crit

541.88

541.88

541.88
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Note:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 5
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Migration Status and Health Recovery Aid
Dependent variable: Migration Status
In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Health Recovery Aid
Age: 31–40
Age: 41–50
Age: 51–60
Age: 61–70
Age: 70þ
Sex (Male)
Marital Status (Married)
Junior High School
Senior High School þ
Income: 500,001–800,000 RP
Income: 800,001–1,000,000 RP
Income: 1,000,000 þ RP
Residence Duration
Environmental Hazards
Medium Destruction
High Destruction
Fears Nature’s Wrath
Residence Damaged
Constant

0.86 (0.51)
0.21 (1.22)
1.24 (0.78)
0.69 (0.85)
1.57 (0.88)
2.00 (1.16)
1.89 (0.70)
3.68 (1.18)
1.38 (0.64)
0.60 (0.62)
0.89 (0.69)
2.01 (0.65)
0.76 (0.74)
0.83 (0.60)
0.71 (0.36)
7.65** (0.69)
3.89 (0.99)
0.94 (0.53)
1.19 (0.62)
0.04* (1.53)

2.45 (0.57)
0.51 (0.70)
0.35 (0.71)
0.05* (1.19)
0.21 (1.22)
0.38 (1.37)
0.55 (0.76)
0.63 (0.93)
1.68 (0.76)
0.63 (0.64)
0.26 (0.95)
0.80 (0.82)
4.23* (0.66)
0.56 (0.72)
1.05 (0.37)
3.01 (0.74)
4.87 (0.93)
2.19 (0.61)
1.46 (0.63)
0.14 (1.33)

4.16** (0.49)
0.87 (0.65)
0.86 (0.66)
0.62 (0.69)
0.86 (0.75)
0.26 (1.10)
1.59 (0.55)
0.45 (0.61)
1.73 (0.53)
0.69 (0.51)
0.81 (0.54)
1.19 (0.57)
0.76 (0.59)
0.43 (0.52)
1.15 (0.28)
6.93*** (0.57)
127.05*** (0.61)
1.43 (0.45)
3.75** (0.49)
0.04** (1.07)

Akaike Inf. Crit

562.43

562.43

562.43

Note:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 6
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Migration Status and Food Recovery Aid
Dependent variable: Migration Status
In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Food Recovery Aid
Age: 31–40
Age: 41–50
Age: 51–60
Age: 61–70
Age: 70þ
Sex (Male)
Marital Status (Married)
Junior High School
Senior High School þ
Income: 500,001–800,000 RP
Income: 800,001–1,000,000 RP
Income: 1,000,000 þ RP
Residence Duration
Environmental Hazards
Medium Destruction
High Destruction
Fears Nature’s Wrath
Residence Damaged
Constant

0.70 (0.48)
0.22 (1.21)
1.26 (0.78)
0.77 (0.84)
1.47 (0.88)
2.07 (1.14)
1.88 (0.68)
3.39 (1.18)
1.43 (0.65)
0.63 (0.61)
0.85 (0.69)
2.05 (0.64)
0.72 (0.74)
0.82 (0.59)
0.72 (0.36)
7.08** (0.69)
3.83 (1.00)
0.96 (0.52)
1.21 (0.62)
0.04* (1.54)

1.58 (0.52)
0.46 (0.70)
0.34 (0.70)
0.05* (1.18)
0.19 (1.21)
0.28 (1.32)
0.66 (0.76)
0.69 (0.92)
1.42 (0.75)
0.56 (0.64)
0.27 (0.95)
0.70 (0.82)
3.90* (0.64)
0.55 (0.73)
1.05 (0.37)
3.06 (0.74)
4.60 (0.91)
2.19 (0.62)
1.69 (0.62)
0.17 (1.31)

1.68 (0.42)
0.75 (0.63)
0.74 (0.65)
0.52 (0.68)
0.70 (0.75)
0.20 (1.06)
1.82 (0.55)
0.56 (0.59)
1.41 (0.53)
0.56 (0.50)
0.78 (0.54)
1.01 (0.55)
0.71 (0.58)
0.42 (0.52)
1.16 (0.27)
7.30*** (0.56)
109.92*** (0.58)
1.32 (0.44)
4.44** (0.48)
0.08* (0.99)

Akaike Inf. Crit

570.82

570.82

570.82

Note:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 7
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Migration Status and Remittances
Dependent variable: Migration Status

Remittances
Age: 31–40
Age: 41–50
Age: 51–60
Age: 61–70
Age: 70þ

In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

0.38 (0.85)
0.19 (1.22)
1.21 (0.78)
0.72 (0.84)
1.34 (0.88)
1.99 (1.13)

1.74 (0.69)
0.52 (0.72)
0.36 (0.70)
0.05* (1.18)
0.19 (1.22)
0.27 (1.34)

0.87 (0.59)
0.75 (0.64)
0.72 (0.64)
0.53 (0.67)
0.64 (0.74)
0.18 (1.06)
(continued on next page)
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Table 7 (continued )
Dependent variable: Migration Status
In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Sex (Male)
Marital Status (Married)
Junior High School
Senior High School þ
Income: 500,001–800,000 RP
Income: 800,001–1,000,000 RP
Income: 1,000,000 þ RP
Residence Duration
Environmental Hazards
Medium Destruction
High Destruction
Fears Nature’s Wrath
Residence Damaged
Constant

2.02 (0.69)
2.97 (1.16)
1.33 (0.64)
0.62 (0.62)
0.91 (0.70)
2.20 (0.64)
0.76 (0.74)
0.83 (0.60)
0.72 (0.36)
7.80** (0.68)
3.98 (0.99)
0.99 (0.52)
1.08 (0.63)
0.04* (1.51)

0.67 (0.75)
0.70 (0.93)
1.48 (0.75)
0.56 (0.63)
0.28 (0.94)
0.73 (0.82)
3.81* (0.64)
0.54 (0.73)
1.05 (0.37)
3.06 (0.74)
4.13 (0.93)
2.08 (0.61)
1.79 (0.63)
0.20 (1.30)

1.97 (0.55)
0.58 (0.60)
1.44 (0.52)
0.57 (0.50)
0.77 (0.53)
1.01 (0.55)
0.68 (0.58)
0.40 (0.52)
1.20 (0.27)
6.98*** (0.56)
106.19*** (0.58)
1.28 (0.43)
4.52** (0.48)
0.11* (0.96)

Akaike Inf. Crit

571.54

571.54

571.54

Note:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 8
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Migration Status and All Types of Recovery Aid
Dependent variable: Migration Status
In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Financial Aid
HealthAid
FoodAid
Remittances
Age: 31–40
Age: 41–50
Age: 51–60
Age: 61–70
Age: 70þ
Sex (Male)
Marital Status (Married)
Junior High School
Senior High School þ
Income: 500,001–800,000 RP
Income: 800,001–1,000,000 RP
Income: 1,000,000 þ RP
Residence Duration
Environmental Hazards
Medium Destruction
High Destruction
Fears Nature’s Wrath
Residence Damaged
Constant

0.64 (0.63)
1.14 (0.60)
0.73 (0.59)
0.36 (0.87)
0.18 (1.23)
0.93 (0.81)
0.63 (0.87)
1.19 (0.89)
2.11 (1.16)
1.96 (0.71)
3.56 (1.20)
1.52 (0.66)
0.62 (0.64)
0.97 (0.72)
2.49 (0.67)
0.80 (0.75)
0.91 (0.62)
0.69 (0.38)
9.39** (0.76)
3.50 (1.05)
0.80 (0.55)
1.08 (0.66)
0.05 (1.55)

15.27*** (0.69)
2.93 (0.72)
0.38 (0.68)
1.36 (0.76)
0.85 (0.78)
0.36 (0.76)
0.05* (1.25)
0.28 (1.26)
0.73 (1.46)
0.60 (0.84)
0.44 (1.00)
1.19 (0.86)
0.41 (0.71)
0.31 (0.97)
1.02 (0.88)
5.67* (0.75)
0.43 (0.82)
0.93 (0.42)
2.06 (0.77)
4.09 (1.01)
3.25 (0.66)
1.22 (0.69)
0.07 (1.47)

5.03*** (0.49)
4.16* (0.57)
0.48 (0.54)
0.60 (0.63)
1.07 (0.70)
0.93 (0.70)
0.72 (0.72)
0.81 (0.78)
0.38 (1.11)
1.74 (0.58)
0.40 (0.63)
1.32 (0.57)
0.53 (0.55)
0.74 (0.58)
1.28 (0.60)
0.82 (0.62)
0.36 (0.55)
1.12 (0.29)
5.11** (0.58)
124.35*** (0.65)
1.73 (0.47)
3.41* (0.51)
0.04** (1.11)

Akaike Inf. Crit

548.77

548.77

548.77

Note:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 9
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Migration Status and Economic Resource Assistance
Dependent variable: Migration Status

Economic Resource Assistance: Both
Economic Resource Assistance: Remittances
Economic Resource Assistance: Financial Aid
Age: 31–40
Age: 41–50
Age: 51–60
Age: 61–70
Age: 70þ
Sex (Male)
Marital Status (Married)
Junior High School
Senior High School þ

In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

0.00*** (0.0000)
0.60 (0.90)
0.68 (0.60)
0.17 (1.23)
0.88 (0.82)
0.64 (0.86)
1.12 (0.90)
1.82 (1.14)
1.95 (0.70)
3.83 (1.20)
1.50 (0.66)
0.68 (0.64)

17.91** (1.00)
1.32 (1.27)
11.72*** (0.68)
0.69 (0.77)
0.36 (0.75)
0.04* (1.22)
0.25 (1.27)
0.42 (1.37)
0.73 (0.83)
0.48 (0.98)
0.91 (0.83)
0.35 (0.71)

4.34 (0.84)
0.38 (1.08)
4.65*** (0.46)
0.94 (0.67)
0.86 (0.67)
0.56 (0.70)
0.71 (0.78)
0.29 (1.06)
1.91 (0.58)
0.46 (0.61)
1.04 (0.56)
0.41 (0.54)
(continued on next page)
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Table 9 (continued )
Dependent variable: Migration Status
In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Income: 500,001–800,000 RP
Income: 800,001–1,000,000 RP
Income: 1,000,000 þ RP
Residence Duration
Environmental Hazards
Medium Destruction
High Destruction
Fears Nature’s Wrath
Residence Damaged
Constant

1.00 (0.72)
2.49 (0.65)
0.80 (0.74)
0.95 (0.61)
0.68 (0.37)
9.47** (0.74)
3.51 (1.03)
0.85 (0.55)
1.12 (0.65)
0.04* (1.55)

0.33 (0.96)
0.84 (0.86)
5.01* (0.73)
0.43 (0.83)
0.95 (0.41)
2.48 (0.77)
3.98 (0.98)
3.28 (0.66)
1.34 (0.68)
0.10 (1.43)

0.78 (0.57)
1.07 (0.58)
0.79 (0.62)
0.34 (0.56)
1.16 (0.29)
5.89** (0.57)
106.59*** (0.62)
1.60 (0.46)
3.99** (0.50)
0.08* (1.01)

Akaike Inf. Crit

549.43

549.43

549.43

Note:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 10
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Migration Status and Resource Recovery Assistance
Dependent variable: Migration Status
In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Resource Recovery Assistance: Both
Resource Recovery Assistance: Health Aid
Resource Recovery Assistance: Food Aid
Age: 31–40
Age: 41–50
Age: 51–60
Age: 61–70
Age: 70þ
Sex (Male)
Marital Status (Married)
Junior High School
Senior High School þ
Income: 500,001–800,000 RP
Income: 800,001–1,000,000 RP
Income: 1,000,000 þ RP
Residence Duration
Environmental Hazards
Medium Destruction
High Destruction
Fears Nature’s Wrath
Residence Damaged
Constant

0.69 (0.58)
0.87 (0.80)
0.56 (0.89)
0.22 (1.22)
1.26 (0.78)
0.74 (0.85)
1.50 (0.88)
2.41 (1.21)
1.86 (0.70)
3.66 (1.19)
1.45 (0.65)
0.59 (0.63)
0.83 (0.70)
2.13 (0.66)
0.72 (0.74)
0.85 (0.60)
0.74 (0.37)
7.31** (0.70)
3.71 (1.01)
0.94 (0.53)
1.17 (0.64)
0.04* (1.54)

2.81 (0.69)
3.13 (0.89)
1.60 (0.92)
0.51 (0.70)
0.34 (0.71)
0.05* (1.19)
0.22 (1.22)
0.36 (1.38)
0.56 (0.75)
0.59 (0.93)
1.70 (0.76)
0.63 (0.65)
0.27 (0.96)
0.77 (0.83)
4.27* (0.66)
0.56 (0.72)
1.01 (0.38)
3.03 (0.75)
5.03 (0.92)
2.26 (0.62)
1.53 (0.63)
0.12 (1.35)

3.49* (0.55)
3.36 (0.73)
0.46 (1.00)
0.90 (0.66)
0.91 (0.67)
0.64 (0.69)
0.84 (0.75)
0.26 (1.13)
1.60 (0.55)
0.47 (0.62)
1.72 (0.53)
0.66 (0.52)
0.77 (0.55)
1.22 (0.57)
0.73 (0.59)
0.43 (0.52)
1.17 (0.28)
6.81*** (0.57)
126.99*** (0.61)
1.38 (0.45)
3.59* (0.50)
0.05** (1.09)

Akaike Inf. Crit

572.92

572.92

572.92

Note:*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 11
Multinomial Logistic Regression Results for Migration Status and Household Recovery Assistance
Dependent variable: Migration Status

Household Recovery Assistance: 1
Household Recovery Assistance: 2
Household Recovery Assistance: 3
Household Recovery Assistance: 4
Age: 31–40
Age: 41–50
Age: 51–60
Age: 61–70
Age: 70þ
Sex (Male)
Marital Status (Married)
Junior High School
Senior High School þ
Income: 500,001–800,000 RP
Income: 800,001–1,000,000 RP
Income: 1,000,000 þ RP
Residence Duration

In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

1.54 (0.74)
1.36 (0.64)
0.27 (0.97)
0.00*** (0.0000)
0.15 (1.25)
0.89 (0.82)
0.61 (0.86)
1.00 (0.92)
1.22 (1.14)
2.14 (0.72)
3.62 (1.18)
1.63 (0.65)
0.83 (0.65)
0.91 (0.71)
2.02 (0.66)
0.80 (0.74)
0.95 (0.61)

3.20 (1.03)
3.01 (0.93)
8.14* (0.96)
34.96** (1.25)
0.71 (0.75)
0.39 (0.74)
0.05* (1.23)
0.26 (1.30)
0.42 (1.39)
0.55 (0.77)
0.57 (0.94)
1.45 (0.79)
0.48 (0.68)
0.26 (0.97)
0.88 (0.85)
5.00* (0.69)
0.44 (0.76)

2.87 (0.74)
1.50 (0.66)
6.33** (0.64)
10.61* (1.02)
0.84 (0.68)
0.83 (0.69)
0.55 (0.71)
0.98 (0.80)
0.34 (1.10)
1.57 (0.57)
0.50 (0.61)
1.28 (0.55)
0.50 (0.54)
0.82 (0.57)
1.31 (0.59)
0.80 (0.61)
0.36 (0.55)
(continued on next page)
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Table 11 (continued )
Dependent variable: Migration Status
In Transition
(1)

Moved On
(2)

Displaced
(3)

Environmental Hazards
Medium Destruction
High Destruction
Fears Nature’s Wrath
Residence Damaged
Constant

0.65 (0.39)
10.80** (0.75)
5.02 (1.04)
0.76 (0.56)
1.08 (0.64)
0.04* (1.57)

0.94 (0.39)
2.97 (0.77)
4.62 (0.97)
2.33 (0.63)
1.66 (0.64)
0.08 (1.50)

1.15 (0.29)
6.60** (0.58)
124.26*** (0.63)
1.54 (0.46)
3.96** (0.49)
0.04** (1.13)

Akaike Inf. Crit

559.91

559.91

559.91

Note:*p<0.05; p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
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